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INTRODUCTION 
As more and more people videotape the police with their cell phones, 
new and interesting First Amendment issues arise. This essay sketches 
several of these issues and proposes some solutions. 
This essay considers whether the First Amendment protects videotaping 
the police and, more importantly, why. The case law largely finds the First 
Amendment applies but focuses almost entirely on one rationale—a 
newsgathering rationale.1 That is, a person may videotape the police 
because such videotaping is necessary to the later free speech right of 
publicizing that video, and any misfeasance it reveals. 
But this essay identifies two other forms of protected speech often 
overlooked by the courts. Jocelyn Simonson, professor at Brooklyn Law 
School, argues that those videotaping the police are making a symbolic 
statement merely by the act of videotaping.2 They are saying, in essence, “I 
am watching you.” This message and type of speech should enjoy the same 
level of protection under the First Amendment as the later speech revealing 
what the officer has done. The speech is central to political protest. 
Those who videotape the police are making art. This might sound silly, 
but the First Amendment protects making art and similar self-expression, 
and when people photograph or videotape the police, they engage in artistic 
expressive activity.3 In a recent Pennsylvania case, a plaintiff arrested for 
photographing the police with his phone said he did so simply because it 
looked “cool” and, in essence, artistic.4 This activity likely enjoys a lower 
level of First Amendment protection—or at least might cede more easily to 
other competing interests—but can help us to understand the different 
strands of speech that make up cell phone recording of police activity. 
Having identified the interests supporting a right to videotape the 
police, we must then answer the harder question: how much protection does 
this right afford? This question splits, in turn, into two sub-questions. First, 
what level of scrutiny should courts apply to videotaping the police and 
second, whether the courts are assessing an ordinance or discretionary 
police activity on the street. This essay argues that under last year’s 
Supreme Court case, Reed v. Town of Gilbert,5 courts should apply strict 
scrutiny, at least to statutes. 
Once we decide upon a level of scrutiny, we must then apply that 
scrutiny to specific statutes, or to specific discretionary activity by the 
police. As for statutes, no statute that particularly singles out cell phone 
videotaping of the police should survive strict scrutiny, or even medium 
scrutiny. Courts should find that existing laws, such as disorderly conduct, 
 
 1.  E.g. Glik v. Cunniff, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 2. Jocelyn Simonson, Beyond Body Cameras: Defending a Robust Right to Record the Police, 
104 GEO. L.J. 1559, 1573 (2016). 
 3. Id. at 1575. 
 4. Fields v. City of Phila., 166 F. Supp. 3d. 528, 532 (E.D. Pa. 2016). 
 5. 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015). 
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assault, or privacy laws, afford police and civil plaintiffs adequate 
protection against intrusions by those who videotape the police. In light of 
the adequacy of existing law, an extra law that expressly targets cell phone 
recording, with the purpose of targeting speech, would be prohibited. 
Lastly, the hardest question asks: how much discretion do the existing 
laws give officers to arrest or otherwise physically interfere with a person 
videotaping the police? Again, Simonson has argued for a robust, per se 
rule that the police may not arrest or stop a person from videotaping unless 
that person is physically interfering with the officer’s duties.6 
Simonson’s rule goes too far. This essay focuses on the existing 
statutes, such as disorderly conduct or assault. In addition to conduct that 
involves actual physical contact, an officer may arrest a person for conduct 
that amounts to an assault.7 For example, attempted battery is conduct 
intended to threaten imminent physical interference.8 The police should be 
able to arrest individuals who are videotaping while also committing other 
minor offenses, such as disorderly conduct, blocking traffic, etc.—though I 
argue that any prosecutor must prove an enhanced mens rea of intent.9 
Invasion of privacy may also afford grounds for restricting cell phone 
recording—for example, when the police interview a rape victim or 
domestic violence victim on the scene, they should be able to order anyone 
recording to stop or move further away. 
A remaining issue is whether the police may arrest or stop a person who 
reasonably appears to present a threat, even if that person does not intend to 
communicate a threat. This issue remains unresolved under Supreme Court 
precedent.10 The Court sidestepped the issue in Elonis,11 but this essay 
concludes that defendants cannot be prosecuted absent proof they intended 
to threaten physical harm or interference, or knew their actions would be 
perceived as a threat. 
When we apply such an intent standard, we will likely find that 
prosecutors will decline to bring cases in ordinary cell phone recording 
situations. After all, a person who records the police with a cell phone is 
unlikely, by doing so, to present a threat of physical violence. 
Unfortunately, many courts12 appear to evince unwarranted deference to 
 
 6. Simonson, supra note 2 at 1577 (“government officials cannot claim that recording 
interferes with police work unless that interference constitutes a physical obstruction to that police 
work.”). 
 7. Gericke v. Begin, 753 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2014) (restriction constitutional if “officer can 
reasonably conclude that the filming itself is interfering, or is about to interfere, with his duties.”). 
 8. Id. 
 9. I would require proof that the individual intended a threat or knew it would be taken as a 
threat of violence or physical interference. 
 10. Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (holding federal threat statute required 
showing of mens rea above negligence based on statutory interpretation, avoiding constitutional 
question). 
 11. Id. 
 12. E.g. Fields, 166 F. Supp. 3d at 532. 
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police decisions, no matter how unsupported they are by objective 
indications of danger. 
Part I discusses the different First Amendment interests underlying a 
right to record the police. Part II discusses the level of First Amendment 
scrutiny likely to apply. Part III applies these principles directly to statutes 
or cases involving recording the police. Part III(A) concludes that statutes 
targeting police recordings should be found unconstitutional. 
The remainder of Part III tackles the key question: when may police 
arrest those recording them in the field? It concludes that we should start 
with existing statutes such as disorderly conduct and interpret those statutes 
to require the heightened mens rea of purpose or knowledge to avoid 
unnecessary incursion on free speech rights.13 In civil cases, by contrast, 
officers should be immune from liability if they reasonably believe the 
person recording presented a threat. 
PART I: PART ONE 
A great many federal circuit courts of appeals are gravitating toward the 
rule that the First Amendment protects an individual’s right to videotape the 
police.14 For example, the First Circuit in Glik v. Cunniff flatly recognized a 
First Amendment right to videotape the police.15 It premised this right on 
the First Amendment right to gather news as part of the process of 
disseminating news. It similarly premised the right in the First Amendment 
function of keeping the government accountable. Recording public officials 
including the police plays a central role in such accountability. 
Numerous other circuits have recognized a right, often of news outlets, 
to videotape public officials.16 Even though many did involve news 
organizations, Glik concluded these precedents apply to ordinary 
individuals, not connected to a news organization.17 As the court in Glik put 
it: “It is of no significance that the present case, unlike. . .many of those 
cited above, involves a private individual, and not a reporter, gathering 
information about public officials.”18 
As noted in the introduction, many of these cases such as Glik premise 
the right to record upon the right to gather information about public 
 
 13. Many criminal laws or offenses already require purpose or knowledge, but many others, 
such as New York’s disorderly conduct statute, allow conviction based on a finding of recklessness. 
 14. Glik, 655 F.3d 78; ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012); see also, Glenn 
Harlan Reynolds & John A. Steakley, A Due Process Right to Record the Police, 89 Wash. U. L. 
Rev. 1203 (2012) (“it seems safe to say the case for First Amendment protection regarding photos 
and video of law enforcement officers in public is quite strong. . .”). 
 15. Glik, 655 F.3d at 83-84. 
 16. Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 2000); Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 
F.3d 436 (9th Cir. 1995); Demarest v. Athol/Orange Cmty. Television, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 82 (D. 
Mass. 2002). 
 17. See Glik, at 83-84. 
 18. Id. at 83. 
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officials.19 The Court in Glik expressly framed the right as one of gathering 
news so as to later circulate it to others.20 Indeed, the cases almost entirely 
limit their rationale to this notion that individuals or the press must be able 
to gather information about public officials so that they may disseminate 
it.21 
On the other hand, the Third Circuit has resisted expressly holding the 
First Amendment protects a right to film the police, though they have done 
so in the context of qualified immunity.22 In other words, they have held 
that the law has not clearly established such a right. 
A. FILMING AS SPEECH 
But we may identify a second First Amendment value and function 
underlying filming the police: protest speech directed at the police 
themselves. When an individual records the police in a manner calculated to 
let them see, she essentially says, “I am watching you.” Indeed, the closer 
she gets, the more noisily she films, or the more numerous the filmers are, 
the more effective is this protest. 
Effective can mean two things. First, filming can be effective in that the 
police understand that the person intends to communicate the message that 
they are, in fact, protesting, contesting,  and resisting. Second, that message 
itself can be effective in actually checking police abuse. “We are watching” 
alone can keep the police from abusing their power even beyond the fear 
that any video will later be distributed—though of course the two are hard 
to disentangle. 
Simonson has most fully articulated this value.23 She has catalogued the 
recent phenomenon of “copwatching,” local groups that set out in an 
organized fashion to keep tabs on police conduct.24 These groups often 
“wear uniforms, carry visible recording devices, patrol neighborhoods, and 
film citizen-police interactions.”25 One point, of course, is to record the 
interactions for later distribution. 
But another and perhaps more salient point of copwatching involves 
protest speech in the moment. The uniforms, the organized patrols, the 
methodological training, and the routine filming form an entire statement: 
“we are watching.” Of course, the symbolic speech likely goes further to 
 
 19. E.g., Smith, 212 F.3d 1332 (“The First Amendment protects the right to gather information 
about what public officials do. . .”). 
 20. Glik, 655 F.3d at 82 (“Gathering information about government officials in a form that can 
readily be disseminated to others serves cardinal First Amendment interest in protecting and 
promoting ‘the free discussion of governmental affairs.’”) 
 21. Simonson, supra note 3 at 1570. 
 22. Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 23. Simonson, supra note 2. But see, Ashutosh Bhagwat, Producing Speech, 56 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1029 (2015) (arguing gathering information or recording images should receive lower First 
Amendment protection than disseminating information). 
 24. Simonson, supra note 3 at 1569. 
 25. Jocelyn Simonson, Copwatching, 104 CAL. L. REV. 391 (Apr. 1, 2016). 
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include other cognate messages: “we do not trust you” or: “stop harassing 
that innocent black man.” 
But as Simonson herself says, the symbolic, or actual, messages might 
sometimes be more positive.26 The groups’ often careful training and 
respectful filming can also be understood as an intention to communicate to 
police: “we respect you when you act professionally”27 or: “we hereby 
appeal to your professionalism.”28 Simonson says that in some jurisdictions, 
at least, the police welcome, or at least tolerate, the copwatchers as 
legitimate and perhaps even helpful.29 
This rationale for a First Amendment right leads to its own conclusions 
about downstream questions such as how close a person may film, or how 
disruptively. A right to film premised in protest seems to afford greater 
protection to get closer to the police, and in a more disruptive fashion, than 
a right premised entirely upon a newsgathering function. 
B.  ART 
The First Amendment protects art.30 It applies to film,31 to theater,32 to 
music,33 to nude dancing,34 to painting, and to photography.35 It applies to 
videos, even those that depict the killing or maiming of animals.36 The 
Second Circuit boldly pronounced that paintings and photographs “always 
communicate some idea or concept to those who view it, and as such are 
entitled to full First Amendment protection.”37 
But of course many of these cases rest upon the expression and 
dissemination of art rather than the making of art.38 Nevertheless, this right 
to disseminate art must necessarily include a right to make art that one can 
disseminate. Thus, analogously to the newsgathering and news 
dissemination argument above, one can imagine courts protecting the right 
to take photographs as much as to sell them—at least when the person 
taking the photograph does intend to disseminate it. 
But what about art for art’s sake? Does the First Amendment protect the 
right to make art that one does not intend to distribute, simply for a person’s 
personal artistry? One must certainly imagine the answer is yes.39 How can 
 
 26. Simonson, supra note 3 at 1573. 
 27. Id. at 1572. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 695 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 31. Joseph Burstyn, Inc., v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952). 
 32. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558 (1975). 
 33. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989). 
 34. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 561 (1991). 
 35. Bery, 97 F.3d at 696. 
 36. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010). 
 37. Bery, 97 F.3d at 696. 
 38. See Stevens, 559 U.S. at 468; Barnes, 501 U.S. at 561; Ward, 491 U.S. at 790; Conrad, 420 
U.S. at 558; Wilson, 343 U.S. at 502; Bery, 97 F.3d at 696. 
 39. C.f., Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57 (Jan. 2014) (arguing that the 
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an artist develop her talent without first taking many photographs she never 
distributes, or painting many paintings she quickly destroys? 
Seth Kreimer, professor at University of Pennsylvania Law School, has 
vigorously argued the First Amendment protects speech with oneself to 
develop one’s faculties, such as making a diary entry: “[a] diary entry 
begins a process of communicating with an audience of oneFalse speech is 
protected not simply as a way of communicating with others, but as a 
means of defining the speaker’s thoughts, intellect, and memories.”40 
A recent cell phone case illustrates the point nicely. In Fields v. City of 
Philadelphia,41 an individual took a picture of the police (at an outdoor 
party) merely because he thought the image looked “cool.” In his testimony, 
he explained, “‘It was an interesting scene. It would make a good 
picture. . .’”42 He evinced no interest in distributing the image further, 
whether for political or even artistic reasons. He simply wanted to satisfy 
his own, internal artistic genius. 
The Court held he had no First Amendment right to photograph the 
party precisely because he had no interest in distributing the image to others 
as part of political speech.43 Arguably, along with Kreimer, he had a 
protected right to make art, even for himself. 
 
* * * 
 
Put together, these three free speech interests can combine to illuminate 
that a person who videotapes the police has an interest in doing so from 
different angles, at different distances, and so on. Of course, safety or 
privacy may limit these interests, but as a prima facie matter, an artist may 
wish to film closer, or from above, to get a more artistic composition. A 
protestor may wish to film closely to ensure the police receive her message: 
“I am watching.” Similarly, protestors might wish to have numerous people 
videotaping at the same time. A person taping for news or later 
dissemination and accountability might also wish to get close to better 
document what is really happening; or also wish to have numerous people 
taping to obtain numerous angles for a better approximation of the truth. 
Of course, all of these points may need to yield in some circumstances 
to government interests in safety or privacy. But we must first identify the 
interests, and the conduct they justify, before we may weigh that conduct 
against the government interest. 
 
First Amendment protects the right of a person to inform themselves simply for its own sake); Seth 
F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory, Discourse, and the Right 
to Record, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 339 (Jan. 2011) (“personal image capture is part of a medium 
of expression entitled to First Amendment cognizance.”). 
 40. Kreimer, supra note 39 at 378-79. 
 41. Supra note 4. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 542. 
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PART II: ORDINANCES, LEVEL OF SCRUTINY, AND BUFFER 
ZONES 
This section provides some background on First Amendment law as it 
relates to ordinances that impinge on speech. These may be ordinances that 
limit signs, create buffer zones, or limit conduct that involves symbolic 
speech. In assessing these ordinances, the Court addresses them facially or 
as applied, but in either case sets up a framework for review. We can apply 
this framework to any proposed ordinance directed at cell phone 
videotaping. 
In a later section I discuss the framework for a slightly different 
question: how should courts review police who act under concededly valid 
laws such as disorderly conduct, menacing, threats, etc., to limit cell phone 
recording? 
A. LEVEL OF SCRUTINY 
Two of the Court’s most recent cases point in different directions as to the 
level of scrutiny that should apply to a law that involves speech. The 
Court’s recent abortion provider buffer zone case used medium scrutiny, 
though several Justices would have used strict scrutiny. Last summer’s case 
involving a town ordinance regulating signs used strict scrutiny; it also 
proclaimed that strict scrutiny should apply to a broad range of situations. I 
will consider these two cases below. 
1. Reed v. Town of Gilbert 
 
In Reed v. Town of Gilbert,44 a town ordinance regulating lawn signs 
created several categories of signs, such as those espousing an ideological 
message versus those providing temporary directions to events.45 Some 
categories, such as the ideological category, had far fewer restrictions than 
other types of signs.46 
So, for example, a sign that the law called “ideological” had few 
restrictions as to size, location, and time. It could be up to twenty square 
feet in area and placed anywhere at any time. But the law imposed greater 
restrictions for those it called “political.” These could only be up to sixteen 
square feet when on a residential property, and could only be displayed up 
to sixty days before a primary and up to sixteen days after a general 
election. 
 
 44. 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
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But the law reserved some of its greatest restrictions for another 
category: “Temporary Directional Signs Relating to a Qualifying Event.” 
These could be no bigger than six square feet appearing no more than 
twelve hours before and one hour after the event. 
Unfortunately for a local church in the town, the law categorized a sign 
for church services as a “Temporary Directional Sign,” therefore imposing 
these harsher restrictions. The church had no fixed location; rather, it held 
services in various locations such as schools in or around the town, and 
therefore relied upon temporary signs posted around town to inform 
parishioners where to go. 
The church typically put up fifteen to twenty signs with its name and 
the time and location of that Sunday’s service. They put them up early 
Saturday and removed them midday Sunday. This was not good enough for 
the town, however. 
The town’s “Sign Code compliance manager” cited the church for 
violating the town’s sign ordinance. The church had left the signs up for too 
long—several hours beyond the one-hour limit on Sundays, and had 
otherwise violated the ordinance. The church tried to reach an 
accommodation with the town, but the compliance manager told the church 
that “there would be ‘no leniency under the Code.’”47 
The church sued and, surprisingly, both the District Court and Ninth 
Circuit upheld the ordinance. The categories were content neutral and the 
code met intermediate scrutiny, according to the Ninth Circuit. 
The Supreme Court reversed. This particular ordinance did not seem to 
present much of a challenge to the Court. The ordinance distinguished 
between messages on their face and was therefore subject to strict scrutiny. 
Under that standard, the distinction between messages could not justify the 
different levels of restriction on the use of signs. 
But the Court went further to create a general test for what counts as 
content regulations that trigger strict scrutiny, and it is this test we must 
consider more carefully. As Justice Kagan pointed out,48 the new test 
enlarges what counts as content-based speech. In particular, the Court held 
that a law counts as content-based if it regulates based on the “topic 
discussed.”49 Even more demanding, the Court held that a law is content-
based if its justification rests by mere “reference” to content—even if the 
law is facially neutral.50 
That is, a facially neutral law counts as content-based, requiring strict 
scrutiny, if the law “cannot be ‘justified without reference to the content of 
 
 47. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226-27 (2015) (opinion of Thomas, J.) (One can imagine he reported 
this particular fact with contempt for the apparent petty tyranny of the compliance manager, and 
one could hardly blame the Justice). 
 48. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2218 (Kagan, J., concurring). 
 49. Id. at 2227 
 50. Id. 
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the regulated speech.’”51 Viewpoint discrimination is merely a more 
“blatant,” or “egregious” form of content discrimination.52 
This test departs from earlier case law, which did not simply deem a 
law content-based if it merely “referred” to the content of speech. Rather, 
the earlier test required more: that the law have been adopted “because of 
disagreement with the message it conveys.”53 
The Seventh Circuit in Norton v. City of Springfield nicely encapsulates 
the Supreme Court’s new standard.54 That case addressed Springfield’s 
panhandling ordinance, which bans oral requests for money now but allows 
signs requesting money later. The plaintiffs claimed the law violated the 
First Amendment by distinguishing messages based on content: those 
asking for money to be mailed later could speak; those who asked for 
money now could not. 
The Seventh Circuit had originally found the Springfield ordinance 
constitutional.55 It regulated on the basis of subject matter but not on the 
basis of content—and was therefore subject to medium scrutiny rather than 
strict scrutiny. The ordinance did not regulate on the basis of content, the 
Seventh Circuit had originally held, because Springfield had not attempted 
to interfere in the marketplace of ideas. It did not take a side in a debate, 
and it did not ban the message because it disagreed with it.56 
But the Seventh Circuit reconsidered the case after Reed, and reversed 
itself. The Seventh Circuit explained that the new test in Reed to determine 
whether a law regulates on the basis of content no longer requires a 
showing that the government passed the law because it disagreed with the 
message. It was now enough under Reed for a plaintiff to show that the law 
regulated on the basis of subject matter, and that we must look to the 
content of the speech to determine that subject matter. 
Under the new Reed test, the Seventh Circuit held that Springfield’s 
ordinance was content-based and therefore subject to strict scrutiny. Even if 
Springfield’s government did not disagree with the message—oral requests 
for money now—the ordinance applied only by reference to that message. 
The ordinance was therefore content-based. 
As the Seventh Circuit concluded, the Supreme Court had made content 
regulation and subject-matter regulation equivalent. Strict scrutiny applies. 
The majority opinion in Reed effectively abolishes 
any distinction between content regulation and 
 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 2230 
 53. Id. 
 54. Norton v. City of Springfield, 806 F.3d 411 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 55. Norton v. City of Springfield, 768 F.3d 713 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 56. One could challenge the Seventh Circuit’s conclusion. A fair reading of the history 
suggests Springfield did pass the ordinance because it disagreed with the message—asking for 
money. 
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subject-matter regulation. Any law distinguishing 
one kind of speech from another by reference to 
its meaning now requires a compelling 
justification.57 
Reed likewise calls into question another Seventh Circuit case: ACLU 
of Ill. v. Alvarez.58 There, the court held that an eavesdropping statute that 
prohibited recording any conversation in public without the consent of 
those to the conversation was unconstitutional. The state had refused to rule 
out applying the law to those using their cell phones to record the police. 
The court held it would violate the free speech rights of those recording the 
police to criminalize their activity under the eavesdropping statute. 
But in so doing, the court held the statute was content-neutral. It 
asserted that the test for whether a law is content-neutral is not simply 
whether law enforcement was to look at the content to determine a 
violation, but rather, whether the legislature enacted the law because it 
disagreed with the content. Of course, Reed held that the test for content 
neutrality is precisely the cone the Seventh Circuit rejected: if law 
enforcement must look at the content of the speech to determine a violation, 
then the statute counts as content-based. Of course, Reed would not have 
affected the outcome in Alvarez, since the court found the statute 
unconstitutional under intermediate scrutiny. 
One year before Reed, the Supreme Court decided McCullen v. 
Coakley59—a case involving an ordinance creating a buffer zone around 
abortion clinics. McCullen likely no longer stands as good law for 
determining whether an ordinance counts as content-based and therefore 
requires a strict scrutiny analysis in light of Reed. I will nevertheless discuss 
that issue briefly as another angle to understand the change brought about 
by Reed. 
I will then consider the more important aspect of McCullen for our 
purposes: even under medium scrutiny, the buffer zone law violated the 
First Amendment. This will have important implications for any law 
purporting to prohibit cell phone recordings of the police. 
2. McCullen v. Coakley 
In McCullen v. Coakley, Massachusetts law made it a crime for anyone 
to stand on a sidewalk within thirty-five feet of an abortion clinic.60 One 
plaintiff, a self-described grandmother who said she sought merely to 
counsel to those entering clinics to get an abortion, sued. She argued the per 
se buffer violated the First Amendment. 
 
 57. Id. at 412. 
 58. 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 59. 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014). 
 60. Id. 
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The Court agreed, holding the ordinance violated the Free Speech 
Clause.61 In doing so, it announced several principles that apply with equal 
force to cell phone video recording of the police. 
First, the Court held that public sidewalks enjoy a special place in our 
culture and history as public fora—-places where we assemble and discuss 
public questions. They also afford an opportunity to reach an audience who 
might not otherwise want to listen to your message. Sidewalks “remain one 
of the few places where a speaker can be confident that he is not simply 
preaching to the choir.”62 
The Court therefore concluded that even though the statute does not, on 
its face, restrict speech, the First Amendment applies because the statute 
restricts access to this traditional public forum so central to free speech. 
Second, the Court determined that the act was not content-based and 
therefore medium, as opposed to strict, scrutiny applied. The plaintiffs had 
argued the law was content-based both because it created buffer zones only 
at abortion clinics and because it exempted clinic employees, thereby 
favoring “one viewpoint about abortion over another.”63 
But the Court found the law not to be content-based. First, on its face it 
did not refer to speech, and law enforcement could determine whether 
someone had violated the statute without regard to speech. Anyone (not an 
employee) within thirty-five feet violated the act regardless of what they 
said. The content of speech was not an element. 
The Court disagreed with Plaintiffs that the legislature, by restricting 
the law to abortion clinics only, essentially was targeting a particular type 
of speech that it disfavored. Again, the Court said that the legislature was 
addressing the physical “crowding, obstruction, and even violence outside 
such clinics”64 and not the speech there. 
The Court similarly disagreed with Plaintiffs that the exception for 
employees showed the legislature was favoring one viewpoint over another; 
the Court said the exception merely allowed the employees to do their job, 
including going to work, rather than creating a favorable class of employee-
escorts who could walk next to women seeking abortions and support them 
in their decision. After all, the exception does not even envision the 
employees talking about abortion; rather, again, it exempts them so they can 
do their jobs. If individual employees or escorts did talk about abortion, 
then that would violate the Massachusetts Act, but would be an 
enforcement issue, the Court concluded. 
Having concluded that the medium scrutiny of time, manner, and place 
restriction applied, the Court then considered whether the act was narrowly 
tailored. That is, under a time, manner, and place justification, the version 
of medium scrutiny the Court applies still carefully reviews the regulations. 
 
 61. Id. at 2519 
 62. Id. at 2529. 
 63. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2523 (2014). 
 64. Id. 
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In particular, the restrictions must be justified “without reference to the 
content of the regulated speech, narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
governmental interest, and leave open ample alternative channels for 
communication of the information.”65 The test does not require the least 
intrusive restriction—as under strict scrutiny—but it must not “burden 
substantially more speech than is necessary.”66 The Court concluded that 
the Massachusetts ordinance failed this test. 
In making the balance, the Court credited the government’s interest in 
keeping the sidewalks outside abortion clinics safe. But it also wrote that 
the law imposed significant burdens on free speech, noting that one-on-one 
conversations were among the “most effective, fundamental, and perhaps 
economical avenue[s] of political discourse.”67 The law prohibited, or at 
least sharply restricted, precisely these kinds of conversations. In some 
ways, the key, the Court said, was to consider that the plaintiffs were not 
protesters—who could chant or display signs as effectively outside a buffer 
zone as within—but “sidewalk counselors” who sought to speak intimately 
with the women entering the clinics.68 
The Court concluded that the law burdened more speech than 
permissible, especially in light of existing law, or other aspects of this 
statute, that already prohibited in a more targeted fashion harassment or 
obstruction. Massachusetts could pass other laws, more carefully tailored to 
the harm they seek to avoid without burdening so much speech. 
We may draw two conclusions for McCullen. First, as to the level of 
scrutiny, we could attempt to harmonize McCullen and Reed by arguing the 
Reed rule applies only to statutes that refer to speech on their face and 
require those enforcing the law to consider the content of speech in deciding 
if the law applies. McCullen does not expressly refer to speech, whereas the 
ordinance in Reed did. 
On the other hand, in light of Reed, the Court would likely find the law 
in McCullen to be content-based because it targeted only abortion clinics 
for buffer zones. In doing so, it essentially chose a topic—abortions—for 
restriction. 
Second, and more important, McCullen teaches that even under medium 
scrutiny, a law that substantially affects speech will be unconstitutional if 
other, more neutral laws could reasonably be expected to address the 
problem. If the law in McCullen does not survive medium scrutiny, then 
surely a statute expressly mentioning content, such as one restricting 
recording of police by setting up a distance requirement, would fail strict 
scrutiny. 
 
 65. Id. at 2529. 
 66. Id. at 2523. 
 67. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2536 (2014). 
 68. Id. at 2535. 
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PART III: CELL PHONE RECORDING 
A. LAWS AIMED AT CELL PHONE RECORDING 
So far, few jurisdictions have taken the drastic step of expressly 
prohibiting, or even restricting by statute individuals from using their cell 
phones to record the police. Last year, a Texas legislator proposed a bill that 
would have made it a crime to film a police officer within twenty-five 
feet69—ten feet less than the McCullen buffer. It would have amended the 
existing more general law barring negligent interference with the police.70 
But this bill remains in committee.71 
Another lawmaker in Arizona proposed a similar law, with a buffer 
zone of twenty feet.72 According to press reports, the Republican lawmaker 
argued that twenty feet should be close enough for a person to get a good 
view of the police officer’s conduct, but far enough away so as not to be a 
distraction or threat.73 Only a few weeks later, however, this sponsor 
withdrew the bill in the face of opposition.74 
Other states are considering laws to clarify when recording the police 
becomes unlawful interference.75 Many of these states appear to be 
contemplating bills that will protect filming, rather than prohibit it.76 
As noted above, the Supreme Court’s holdings in Reed—and especially 
McCullen—make it unlikely that any law that creates a per se buffer zone 
for recording the police will survive a First Amendment challenge. If the 
law refers to a person who records police conduct, then the law expressly 
mentions a topic or subject matter of speech, which under Reed would 
constitute a content-based restriction requiring strict scrutiny review. This 
follows because, under Reed, when law enforcement must consider the 
content of the speech, it counts as content-based even if the legislature does 
not evince disagreement with the message. How can law enforcement 
 
 69. H.B. 2918, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2015). 
 70. TEX. PENAL L. § 38.15(a)(1) (“A person commits an offense if the person with criminal 
negligence interrupts, disrupts, impedes, or otherwise interferes with a peace officer while the peace 
officer is performing a duty or exercising authority imposed or granted by law.”). 
 71. Relating to the Prosecution of the Offense of Interference with Public Duties; Increasing a 
Penalty: Hearing on H. B. 2918 Before the H, Select Comm. on Emerging Issues in Texas Law 
Enforcement, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2015) (March 26, 2015–”No action taken in committee”). 
 72. S.B. 1054, 52nd 2nd Leg., 2nd Sess. (Ariz. 2016) (making filming within twenty feet 
without permission a petty offense, but if the person fails to obey a warning to stop, a misdemeanor). 
 73. Steven Nelson, Arizona May Criminalize Recording Cops in Public, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REPORT, Jan. 11, 2016, http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-01-11/arizona-may-
criminalize-recording-cops-in-public. 
 74. Philip A. Janquart, Bill Limiting Filming of Police Dies in Arizona, COURTHOUSE NEWS 
SERVICE, Jan. 28, 2016, http://www.courthousenews.com/2016/01/28/bill-limiting-filming-of-
police-dies-in-arizona.htm. 
 75. Hansi Lo Wang, All Things Considered: Civilians Can Record Police Encounters, But 
When is it Interference? (NPR radio broadcast, Apr. 9, 2015). 
 76. John Haughey, Top Ten State Legislation Trends to Watch in 2016, CQ ROLL CALL, Dec. 
29, 2015, http://cqrollcall.com/statetrackers/top-10-state-law-trends-to-watch-in-2016/. 
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determine whether a person is filming the police or filming something else, 
like the sunset? By looking at what they filmed, to start. Any trial would 
introduce the content of the film as Exhibit A. 
Once we decide upon strict scrutiny review, any law that simply 
establishes a per se twenty-foot (say) prohibition would likely fail to meet 
the least restrictive alternative standard. The Court would likely hold that 
less intrusive laws that are more narrowly tailored can sufficiently protect 
officer and public safety. The Court would likely point to existing laws, 
such as those banning interference with the police, as affording sufficient 
protection without targeting or referencing speech or recording. 
Even under intermediate scrutiny which would treat such a law as a 
restriction not directly on speech but as one on the time, manner, and place 
of the recording—that law would likely fail. As McCullen makes clear, 
where existing law appears to supply adequate tools to guard against those 
who, in recording the police, might interfere with their duties, the state must 
rely on those laws rather than taking an expedient that would substantially 
intrude upon free speech. 
A buffer zone for cell phone recording would substantially intrude upon 
free speech rights, in much the same way as the law in McCullen did. In 
McCullen, the plaintiffs needed to be close so as to have calmer, more 
intimate counseling-type conversations with the women seeking abortions. 
For one recording the police, getting close can often be necessary to 
properly hear the conversation and to see what is really happening. This is 
particularly true given that police officers will sometimes block the person 
recording their conduct to avoid being recorded. 
Any law that attempts to set down per se rules regarding the recording 
of police will likely fail. But laws that set forth prohibitions based on 
general concerns should, if properly crafted, survive. With respect to buffer 
zones, existing laws that prohibit assault or interference with police duties, 
prohibit the feared conduct without targeting, referencing, or singling out 
speech or recording activities. A person who gets too close to the police 
might be interfering or causing apprehension regardless of whether they are 
recording. 
Similarly, laws that balance the right to record against privacy interests 
should also survive. A law that generally prohibits wiretapping and 
eavesdropping on private conversations, for example (like Illinois’ new 
eavesdropping statute) makes sense. After all, we do not want individuals to 
videotape the police when they take a statement from a rape victim, or a 
victim of domestic violence, even if that occurs in public by some 
necessity. Nor do we want an individual to film an undercover officer 
talking to a confidential informant, though this scenario might require 
careful balancing and discussion. 
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B. POLICE DISCRETION 
We come finally to the hardest issue: police discretion to order someone 
to stop recording—or discretion to arrest someone for doing so. Let us 
assume an officer acts under an existing law that does not target cell phone 
recording, such as a law that prohibits interfering with official duties, or 
disorderly conduct. 
Such laws, even on their face, contain problematic discretion aside from 
cell phone recording. New York’s disorderly conduct statute, for example, 
includes a prohibition on failing to obey a lawful order, or creating a 
“physically offensive condition” by any act that “serves no legitimate 
purpose.”77 These terms, typical to many statutes, supply officers with 
power and discretion that one can easily see might lead to abuse. Vague 
terms such as “no legitimate purpose,”78 or “lawful order,” can easily create 
mischief. 
The mischief becomes multiplied when an individual videos an officer 
who does not want to be recorded. The recording itself suddenly seems a 
threat, or an offensive condition, or, once ordered to stop, disobeying a 
lawful order. 
On the other hand, disorderly conduct is a real thing; police must be 
able to order people to stop creating a hazard. They likewise must be able to 
perform their jobs without physical threats or interference. Thus, changing 
the words of a particular law may matter less than addressing conduct in the 
field. In other words, when it comes to cell phone recording, what should 
the rules be? 
City of Houston v. Hill79 provides further help considering police in the 
field, even though that case involved a facial challenge to a statute. In that 
case, the statute prohibited verbally interrupting an officer in the their 
duties. The Court held the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad because 
it proscribed so much protected speech. It was not, for example, narrowly 
tailored to proscribe “fighting words” or disorderly conduct. It targeted the 
speech of those who merely verbally oppose police action, or words that 
merely annoy or offend the police. The First Amendment protects such 
speech. 
But in a footnote, the Court did provide examples of statutes that might 
be constitutional even though they prohibited words only. First, a statute 
might be constitutional if it prohibited a person from standing next to an 
officer, who was directing traffic, and engaging with that officer in such a 
way as to distract the officer and cause traffic problems. This illustration 
does not involve physical interference. Rather, a verbal distraction, which 
 
 77. NEW YORK PENAL L. § 240.20. 
 78. E.g. Gray v. Kohl, 568 F. Supp. 2d 1368 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (holding statute that prohibited 
anyone from entering within 500 feet of a school with no “legitimate business” unconstitutionally 
vague). 
 79. City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987). 
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might survive a challenge, according to the Court. Second, the Court said 
that a statute that prohibited a person from running alongside an officer and 
physically obstructing him, while also speaking, might survive as long as 
the statute targeted the physical obstruction. 
Though addressing possible statutes, these two illustrations from Hill, 
albeit dicta, support a view that a police officer may arrest someone under a 
disorderly conduct statute for words that, in the context and combined with 
physical proximity or threats, present imminent interference. 
We also do not want to erect a per se rule protecting all cell phone 
recording in all circumstances because there are too many variations on 
how a situation may play out to address, in advance and with per se rules, 
what manner of recording will implicate undue interference with the police, 
whether in the form of actual physical interference or in the form of a threat 
or even distraction. Every situation is different. 
On the other hand, the open-textured power afforded by many 
disorderly conduct laws creates a great risk of abuse by police. This risk 
becomes magnified because the police, perhaps defensively, have a great 
incentive to order a person to stop recording for improper reasons. 
Moreover, in the great majority of cases, it is hard to see how cell phone 
recording will create a genuine threat. 
C. PROPOSED RULE 
This essay proposes a general rule of guidance for police enforcing 
existing laws such as disorderly conduct to maintain order on the street, 
without violating the free speech rights of those recording them. We must 
begin by distinguishing criminal cases—cases in which the government 
prosecutes a person criminally for recording the police—versus civil cases 
in which the individual sues the police for false arrest or a violation of her 
Fourth Amendment rights. I will begin on the criminal side. 
As an obvious threshold, the government would need to identify some 
existing criminal law or offense under which to prosecute the person 
recording the police—such as disorderly conduct. This offense, in turn, 
would ordinarily mean that the person presented a threat of violence, a 
threat to safety, or obstructed traffic in a substantial way. It would not be 
enough, therefore, for the government simply to allege generally that the 
police perceived some generalized threat. 
But I would also add an enhanced mens rea requirement derived from 
the First Amendment. The government would also have to prove that the 
person acted with intent—meaning purpose or knowledge—to create such a 
threat. I say “enhanced” because some disorderly conduct statutes,80 or 
harassment or threat statutes, merely require a mens rea of recklessness or 
even gross negligence.81 
 
 80. N.Y. PENAL L. § 240.20 (2016). 
 81. TEX. PENAL L. § 38.15 (2016). 
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Thus, for example, if a person records the police and blocks traffic, they 
can only be prosecuted if they sought to block traffic, or at least knew that 
they were blocking traffic. If an individual gets so close to an officer that 
the officer reasonably believes he is being threatened, the individual can 
only be found guilty of a crime or offense if the government can prove the 
individual intended to cause a threat, or knew their conduct created this 
appearance of a threat. 
In a civil case, by contrast, when a person arrested sues the police under 
§ 1983 for a violation of their free speech rights, that plaintiff must 
establish that the officer perceived a threat and was unreasonable in 
believing the filmer presented a threat. In other words, even if the person 
filming the officer did not intend to create a threat, and did not even know 
their conduct might create a threat, they may not recover damages without a 
showing of some culpability on the part of the officer. Again, this 
culpability would take its familiar form: a reasonable officer would not 
have perceived the conduct as a physical threat.82 
Let’s return to New York’s disorderly conduct statute to see a little 
better how these principles may play out. In rough summary, the statute 
prohibits certain conduct, such as fighting or threats or unreasonable noise, 
undertaken with an intent to cause inconvenience, alarm, etc.83 Let’s break 
the statute into mens rea and conduct, and apply my rule from above. 
The statute contains a mens rea of intent or recklessness. I would 
require intent (purpose or knowledge) in the context of filming; a showing 
of recklessness would not suffice. In addition, the type of intent in the New 
York disorderly conduct statute does not suffice. It forbids particular types 
of intent, including an intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or 
alarm. I would require that the intent at issue be on firmer footing: an intent 
to engage in the forbidden conduct (such as fighting) or to create a threat of 
that conduct. 
Next, the conduct: it forbids seven categories of conduct. Summarized, 
these are: (1) fighting or threats; (2) unreasonable noise; (3) obscene 
language; (4) disturbing lawful assembly; (5) obstructing traffic; (6) 
refusing to comply with a lawful order to disperse; and (7) creating a 
hazardous or physically offensive condition without a legitimate purpose.84 
I will consider Subsections (1) and (5) only, since they are most 
applicable to cell phone recording. Subsection (6) would apply only if 
either Subsection (1) or (5) already did. (Privacy or eavesdropping laws 
might also apply.) 
Subsection (2) bans loud noise such as parties or stereos, and thus 
should rarely apply to cell phone recording. Subsection (3) prohibits 
obscenity. To the extent obscenity refers to obscene pornography, this 
 
 82. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (qualified immunity protects what a reasonable 
officer believed was lawful; it protects mistakes of fact as well as mistakes of law). 
 83. N.Y. PENAL L. § 240.20 (2016). 
 84. Id. 
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category does not apply to cell phone recording; to the extent it applies to 
profanity, when directed to the police, the First Amendment usually 
protects profanity.85 Finally, Subsection (7) should be interpreted as 
applying to pollution or smells, and not cell phone recording. We are thus 
left primarily with Subsections (1), (5), and (6) as the core cases. 
This leaves us with a fairly straightforward general rule under New 
York’s disorderly conduct statute, and most typical disorderly conduct 
statutes as applied to recording the police. The police may arrest a person 
recording with their cell phone if they physically interfere, or threaten to 
interfere, with police duties, or with traffic, and the person does so 
knowingly or purposely. If the person lacks this mens rea, the officer can 
tell them that they are blocking traffic, or interfering with the officer’s 
duties, and order them to stop. If the individual actually is blocking traffic 
or interfering, and if the person persists in filming despite the warning, that 
continuing conduct should generally supply strong evidence of the required 
mens rea. 
If the police do arrest a person, courts and juries will have to assess 
whether the person did actually physically interfere, or threaten to do so. 
With respect to actual physical interference, often the cell phone video itself 
will help with this task. In cases of threat, however, juries will have a 
tougher time determining whether the person filming actually presented a 
threat. Since this is a criminal prosecution, it is not enough to show the 
officer reasonably believed the person presented a threat; rather, the jury 
must find the person actually did present a threat (of physical interference 
or harm), and that the person continued to film with this purpose, or at least 
knowing the conduct was threatening. 
During such a trial, defense counsel will generally argue that the jury or 
court must treat any avowals by officers that the defendant presented an 
actual threat with skepticism. First, officers are likely to be defensive and 
will sometimes make decisions based upon their own interest in shielding 
their conduct (whether that conduct is appropriate or not). Second, those 
who film the police are almost certainly the least likely to present a genuine 
physical threat. They are filming instead of physically interfering. These 
commonsense observations seem a sensible starting point, but of course one 
can easily imagine exceptions on both sides: well-trained officers who give 
ample leeway to those taping them; meddlesome individuals who film in 
order to distract or interfere with lawful process. 
Suppose the jury acquits. The defendant may then sue arguing the 
officer, in arresting her, violated her First or Fourth Amendment rights, or 
state tort law. In either case, the plaintiff will likely have to prove, under the 
underlying cause of action, that a reasonable officer would not have 
 
 85. E.g., United States v. Poocha, 259 F.3d. 1077 (9th Cir. 2001) (First Amendment protects 
defendant who said “fuck you” to officer arresting him). 
 Cell Phone Buffer Zones 113 
perceived the conduct as a threat. I suggest this standard would be 
consistent with the First Amendment. 
One probably notices a lacuna between the two standards—one for 
criminal prosecution and another for civil remedies. The same situation, a 
police officer arresting a person filming, could result in acquittal in the 
criminal case and a finding of no liability against the officer in the civil 
case. This middle ground simply reflects ordinary burden of proof 
requirements. Both the prosecution and the individual may not be able to 
establish their respective causes of action. They are not mirror images of 
each other; if a person is acquitted, that acquittal does not mean they must 
win their civil suit. 
PART IV: CONCLUSION 
This essay sketches some of the major principles underlying an 
individual’s use of a cell phone to record the police and the First 
Amendment. A few states have shakily begun to introduce laws to 
specifically create buffer zones within which individuals may not record the 
police, but seem to have abandoned these misguided efforts—misguided 
because they are almost certainly unconstitutional under cases such as Reed, 
and especially McCullen. The more difficult issue arises when police 
enforce, or purport to enforce, ordinary laws such as disorderly conduct, as 
against those filming. In these cases, we must first impose certain additional 
protections to ensure these laws of general applicability do not substantially 
intrude upon free speech. For disorderly conduct, for example, I propose we 
require a showing that the person filming intended his conduct as a threat. 
Second, juries must meet any assertion by officers that they acted out of 
concerns for safety with skepticism, given the obvious conflict of interest 
and defensiveness a typical officer will likely have in the face of close or 
persistent recording of his or her activities. 
 
